Wittgenstein on Knowledge (1949-1951) by Bouchard, Yves
  52
Wittgenstein on Knowledge (1949-1951) 
Yves Bouchard, Sherbrooke / Quebec 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I want to characterize Wittgenstein’s episte-
mology, namely his contextualism, presented in his notes 
published under the title On Certainty. This characteriza-
tion will be made in terms of a comparison with four control 
points in order to put into light the peculiarities of Wittgen-
stein’s epistemological position. The markers I will use for 
that purpose will give an indication of the level of concep-
tual commitment toward four important epistemological 
theses: holism, internalism, fallibilism, and egalitarianism. 
These markers have been chosen in function of the power 
of discrimination they provide regarding the two main 
trends in the past 40 years (or so) of debate in contempo-
rary epistemology, i.e., foundationalism and coherentism. 
Using these conceptual markers, one can easily distin-
guish between strict foundationalism, which shows a low 
level of each markers, and strict coherentism, which shows 
a high level of each markers. 
2. Holism 
The first marker will enable us to evaluate the level of 
holism present in Wittgenstein’s perspective. Holism will be 
taken here as a conceptual framework into which the 
properties of particular objects are determined by their 
belonging to a whole of some sort. In this case, the 
property of being an instance of knowledge for a given 
propositional belief will be determined by its relation to a 
background system of beliefs. About the necessity of such 
a relation, Wittgenstein is quite clear: “Our knowledge 
forms an enormous system. And only within this system 
has a particular bit the value we give it” (§ 410; § 432). 
Each token of knowledge (K-belief) is a point on this 
epistemic plan, and it is only in virtue of this holistic relation 
that one can make a difference between a mere belief and 
a K-belief. It makes no sense to assess the epistemic 
value of a propositional belief in isolation, since “what we 
believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of 
propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)” (§ 
141; § 274)1. Each part is strongly connected to the whole, 
so that only on the basis of the latter is the former possible. 
Wittgenstein applies this analysis to the counterparts of K-
beliefs, i.e., doubts (D-beliefs). Doubts are also parts of a 
system, outside which they are simply meaningless (§§ 
115, 126, 247). The overall balance of a particular belief 
system is primarily determined by the mutual influence of 
K-beliefs and D-beliefs, and the quantity of conceptual 
tension emerging from it. But, as in the case of the expres-
sion of knowledge, the expression of doubt can only stem 
from a specific system, i.e., in the same way a belief that 
does not connect up with other beliefs (a fragment of a 
belief system) cannot be turned into a K-belief, such a 
belief cannot be turned into a D-belief either (§ 312; § 
102). 
This conception of a belief system suggests the idea that 
propositional beliefs can be differentiated in terms of their 
positioning within the propositional system or in terms of 
their epistemological function. Some beliefs stand in a 
special position, in that they escape doubt and act as 
                                                     
1 “It isn’t a proposition which I put against reality as a yardstick, it’s a system of 
propositions” (Philosophical Remarks, § 82). 
foundations (§§ 89, 415, 449, 512). Wittgenstein sees 
such beliefs as “axis”, “hinges”, and even “axioms” (§§ 
152, 341, 551). And, here, if the emphasis put by him on 
the systematic character of our beliefs might have pointed 
toward a coherentist position, now the insistence upon the 
necessity of basic beliefs tends to point toward founda-
tionalism. Wittgenstein is at some extent in agreement with 
both positions, at least in what makes their respective 
specificity. 
The epistemological function of these basic beliefs is to 
open a conceptual space for the deployment of a lan-
guage-game and, by the same token, to provide a world-
picture, as Wittgenstein calls it (§§ 95, 167). This concep-
tual opening is nothing but a semantic move, for the 
boundary of this space is set by the truth of the basic 
beliefs: “[my picture of the world] is the inherited back-
ground against which I distinguish between true and false” 
(§ 94). Basic beliefs serve as entry points for truth in the 
belief system (§ 83). They are methodologically immune to 
doubt, but if someone persists in extending his doubt to his 
basic beliefs, then he would simply lose his epistemologi-
cal yardstic, as Wittgenstein underlines: “this statement 
appeared to me fundamental; if it is false, what are ‘true’ or 
‘false’ any more?!” (§ 514). This is precisely where speak-
ers of a language-game do meet: in their taking true a 
number of propositions. If they do not share that minimal 
requirement, they cannot take part to a common language-
game2 (§§ 80, 628). 
How does one acknowledge the truth of these basic 
beliefs? In that regard, Wittgenstein does not follow the 
foundationalist line of thought. The truth of the basic 
beliefs cannot be grounded in the beliefs themselves (strict 
foundationalism) or in their cognitive source (reliabilism). 
These beliefs are declared true for the sake of the game; 
this is a methodological requirement. Their truth is what 
renders possible action in a language-game: “Giving 
grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an 
end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us 
immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our 
part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the lan-
guage-game” (§ 204). Just like rules, these basic beliefs 
“form the basis for action” (§ 411) in permitting some 
moves and prohibiting others in a particular conceptual 
space (§ 95). 
This mutual dependence between rules and games ties 
strongly the basic beliefs with the rest of the belief system 
itself, so that it is not possible to conceive them (and their 
truth) outside the (vague) boundaries set by the corre-
sponding language-game. The basic beliefs are not only 
supporting the belief system, but they are supported by it 
as well: “And one might almost say that these foundation-
walls are carried by the whole house” (§ 248). This bi-
directional relation of support is characteristic of a holistic 
system and remains incompatible with standard founda-
tionalism3. For Wittgenstein, even in a paradigm of a 
foundationalist system (unidirectional) as an axiomatic 
system can one observe this mutual support that connects 
                                                     
2 The Davidsonian program of a theory of interpretation based on a theory of 
truth finds here an additional justification. 
3 For a non-strict foundationalist perspective on mutual support, see S. Haack 
(1993) and her crossword puzzle analogy. 
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axioms and theorems (§ 142)4. As a result, the Wittgen-
steinian analysis of the properties of a belief system 
exhibits a high level of holism. 
3. Internalism 
Another bone of contention between coherentism and 
foundationalism is the location of the source of epistemic 
normativity. And if the Wittgensteinian perspective had 
given the impression in the previous section to be more in 
line with the coherentist position – while not being reduci-
ble to it –, with respect to the internalist issue it shows 
more of a foundationalist trait. For Wittgenstein, the source 
of epistemic justification, namely the basis for the use of 
the K-predicate in a given context, cannot lie only inside 
one’s own belief system: “When I ask ‘Do I know or do I 
only believe that I am called...?’ it is no use to look within 
myself” (§ 490). And the reason is that: “An inner experi-
ence cannot shew me that I know something”(§ 569). The 
notion of context puts into light the environment of the 
epistemic agent – as opposed to the notion of system 
within a strict coherentist framework –, and that involves 
not only a plurality of epistemic agents but also something 
that is partially shared by each and everyone of them. The 
use of the K-predicate is well regimented by the contextual 
rules that govern any particular language-game and these 
practices are exactly what is shared by a community of 
participants. In that perspective, to know something and to 
be acknowledged as such is a community affair, as 
Wittgenstein points out: “If someone says he knows 
something, it must be something that, by general consent, 
he is in a position to know” (§ 555). One cannot know 
alone5. Epistemic normativity, like linguistic normativity, 
can only take place, or emerge, within a common sphere 
of practices (§ 298). In that regard, the position of Wittgen-
stein shows a low level of internalism. 
4. Fallibilism 
Concerning the possibility of being wrong when using the 
K-predicate, Wittgenstein is affirmative: “It might surely 
happen that whenever I said ‘I know’ it turned out to be 
wrong” (§ 580). The main difficulty here consists in over-
coming the apparent incompatibility between the meaning 
of the K-predicate and the acceptance of fallibilism. In 
order to see how the two claims are combined, we need to 
consider two distinct aspects involved in the problem: the 
factual one and the practical one. These aspects require a 
distinction between falsity and misuse. It is possible for a 
statement to be true and still to be result of a misapplica-
tion. For instance, “I believe my name is Y.B.” is true – in 
fact, both the metastatement and the statement are true –, 
but the use of “I believe” instead of “I know” is incorrect in 
the language-game with people’s name under normal 
circumstances (§§ 425, 622). And, of course, a statement 
may be the result of a correct use while still being false – 
only the statement in this case (§§ 12, 425). The use of the 
K-predicate does not ensure infallibility, but rather it allows 
a speaker to make the following inference: If Ks(p), then p. 
The inference may turn out to be invalid, and depending 
on the level of entrenchment of p in the system this could 
affect the boundaries of the language-game at stake. 
Wittgenstein’s position displays consequently a high 
level of fallibilism, which in turn entails a high level of 
                                                     
4 This is an interesting echo of a Tractarian intuition about the number of 
axioms required in a formal system (§§ 6.127, 6.1271). 
5 This parallels the private language argument (Philosophical Investigations, 
§§ 243-315). 
revisability. It may be the case that in principle “no state-
ment is immune to revision”, to recall the Quinean adage, 
but in practice, some statements must be protected 
against revision (or doubt) in such a way that a context for 
a definite language-game may be set (§§ 492, 497, 620). 
Wittgenstein illustrates this subtle balance and interaction 
between what actually can and what cannot be revised by 
means of an analogy with the relative flux of waters and 
the relative stability of the river-bed: “The mythology may 
change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts 
may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the 
waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; 
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the 
other. [...] And the bank of that river consists partly of hard 
rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible 
one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another 
gets washed away, or deposited” (§§ 97-99). This phe-
nomenon of erosion occurs within any language-game 
quite naturally as a part of its normal life. The relation 
between what fixes the boundaries of a conceptual space 
and what is moving within it is dynamic and subject to 
change: “It might be imagined that some propositions, of 
the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and 
functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as 
were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered 
with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard 
ones became fluid” (§ 96). This important feature of 
Wittgenstein’s contextualism enables him to escape the 
charge of relativism, because despite the acknowledge-
ment of the relative process converting partially the stable 
into flux, and vice-versa, he claims that knowledge remains 
possible in as much the use of the K-predicate is con-
ceived as being always contextualized. 
5. Egalitarianism 
The last control point will provide another perspective on 
the relation between propositional beliefs and a belief 
system. If the status of a propositional belief can be 
revised so that it can be at one point a “hardened proposi-
tion” and at another a “fluid proposition”, does this imply 
that initially every proposition displays some kind of 
indifference to enter into one particular structure as 
opposed to another? One may approach this difficulty 
otherwise: can any proposition express something by its 
own semantic resources (conceived in isolation) about its 
own positioning in a given belief system6? Is the overall 
belief system initially an egalitarian system, where each 
particular belief has an equal epistemic status? Here 
again, the solution to this difficulty will indicate the relative 
position of Wittgenstein’s perspective on a scale that goes 
from strict foundationalism to strict coherentism. It is no 
surprise that Wittgenstein expresses the need for restric-
tion: “But if someone were to say ‘So logic too is an 
empirical science’ he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the 
same proposition may get treated at one time as some-
thing to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing” 
(§ 98). This stand suggests that propositions of one 
language-game cannot be exported to another without 
some epistemic alteration, but that within the same 
language-game a given proposition may be equally 
available to occupy different positions (or functions). And 
even considering the latter case, Wittgenstein shows some 
hesitation: “Isn’t what I am saying: any empirical proposi-
tion can be transformed into a postulate – and then 
becomes a norm of description. But I am suspicious even 
of this. The sentence is too general. One almost wants to 
                                                     
6 So, in that respect, no proposition would have any special epistemic status 
over the others. That is a Tractarian idea: “All propositions are of equal value” 
(§ 6.4). 
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say ‘any empirical proposition can, theoretically, be 
transformed...’, but what does ‘theoretically’ mean here? It 
sounds all too reminiscent of the Tractatus” (§ 321). This 
hesitation might be better understood as an implicit 
reiteration of the recognition that there is something wrong 
in thinking that a proposition can be conceived in isolation 
of a system in such a way that it could be seen as indiffer-
ent toward possible uses. This is an extrapolation we 
cannot make, a proposition (or a set of propositions) we 
cannot conceive, this is simply an illusion. The epistemic 
status (or function) of a given proposition is revisable but 
only within the limits of the context the proposition belongs 
to. As a consequence, Wittgenstein’s conception displays 
finally a low level of egalitarianism. 
6. Conclusion 
Now, considering the results of the four conceptual mar-
kers, we end up with a high level of holism and fallibilism, 
and a low level of internalism and egalitarianism. This puts 
Wittgenstein’s contextualism somewhere between a coher-
entist position and a foundationalist one. An interesting 
aspect of the Wittgensteinian analysis is that in a certain 
way it makes justice to the two apparent incompatible 
intuitions behind coherentism and foundationalism7: the 
intuition that the epistemic value of a propositional belief 
comes from its position (or function) within a belief system, 
and the intuition that some propositional beliefs have to 
assume a foundational function in order to make possible 
and to specify a particular belief system. This, as it stands, 
is an important contribution to contemporary epistemology. 
Another aspect of this contribution consists in the rejec-
tion of some sort of Tractarian program extended to epis-
temology. In the same manner Wittgenstein had aban-
doned (1929) the project of finding the general form of a 
proposition, we are invited to abandon our quest for a 
general form of knowledge. There is no such a thing as a 
unique model of epistemic justification that would apply to 
each conceptual domain. And very much like the notion of 
language in the Philosophical Investigations has been 
approached by means of analogies with games, forms of 
life, family resemblances, the notion of knowledge should 
be approached with the aid of analogies with world-pic-
tures, mythologies, and in particular contexts, as Wittgen-
stein remarks: “Only the accustomed context allows what 
is meant to come through clearly” (§ 237). 
                                                     
7 In a different manner than S. Haack (1993) does, for instance. 
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